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firms in latecomer developing countries. Based on a detailed analysis of Vietnam’s 
motorcycle industry, the paper argues that China’s impact may go beyond what a 
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Local Firms in Latecomer Developing Countries amidst China’s Rise 





With its vast, low-cost labor pool of skilled human resources as well as a firm and 
diverse industrial foundation built through a long history of industrialisation, China has 
recently emerged as the “world’s factory” for a wide range of industries–from apparel 
and footwear to steel, electronics, and motor vehicles. Reflecting widespread concerns 
about China’s threat, studies on China’s economic performance and its implications for 
developing countries abound (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Ravenhill 2006; Yang 2006). 
An aspect that has received particular attention in these studies is the role of foreign 
affiliates, which now account for more than half of China’s total exports, in diversifying 
China’s export structure towards high-tech segments, promoting technology transfer, 
and spurring China’s participation in production sharing with other countries in the 
region (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Ravenhill 2006; Lemoine & Ünal-Kesenci 2004). 
In this context, exports by local Chinese firms have frequently been dismissed as 
“lagging behind” (Lemoine & Ünal-Kesenci 2004: 841). However, local Chinese firms 
have demonstrated overwhelming competitiveness in mass production of mature, 
standardised products at low cost. While China’s competitiveness in simple 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries like apparel and footwear is already widely 
known, recently we have even witnessed the emergence of China’s local lead firms with 
internationally recognised brands, e.g. TCL and Haier in consumer electronics. Indeed, 
industries that adopt mature, standardised technology are the ones where China’s 
exports have produced a massive impact on local firms in developing countries and 
especially latecomer developing countries. Numerous reports document how Chinese 
                                                  
1 The paper is based on the research project “Motorcycle Industry in Asia” undertaken at the 
Institute of Developing Economies from 2004 to 2006 and is also a revised version of the paper 
presented at the pre-conference workshop “Asian Drivers: China and India Shaping the Global 
Political Economy” for the Eighth Annual Global Development Conference in Beijing, China on 
12-13 January 2007. The author gratefully acknowledges the insights provided by members of the 
IDE research project and the comments by participants of the workshop but takes full responsibility 
for any remaining shortcomings. 
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goods are dominating the market for consumer goods in developing countries in 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa2. Against this background, one of the important 
questions facing developing countries today is: how will China’s rise affect the 
development trajectories of indigenous firms in latecomer developing countries?  
While previous attempts to explore the impact of China’s rise have largely centred 
around analysis of trade data (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Yang 2006; Lemoine & 
Üna-Kesenci 2004; Stevens and Kennan 2006), the impact of China’s rise on firms in 
developing countries may go far beyond what trade figures suggest. An important aspect 
that tends to be overlooked in the analysis of trade is the distinction between the nature 
of the goods, i.e., whether they are raw materials, intermediate goods, or goods for final 
consumption, which has important implications for the channels through which China’s 
rise affects local firms. Even where the nature of the goods is taken into account (e.g., 
Lall and Albaladejo 2004), very few studies consider the reaction from the local firms – 
the strategies pursued, as well as the factors, external or internal to the firms, that 
influence the viability of the strategies. Given the growing importance of the issue, what 
is mostly lacking and is in need are studies that go beyond the analysis of trade to 
specifically examine the different channels through which China’s rise affects the 
development trajectories of local firms in a specific industry.  
This paper is an attempt to fill that gap by presenting a case study of the motorcycle 
industry in Vietnam. While China itself is the world’s largest market and producer of 
motorcycles, over the past several years local Chinese firms have actively sought to 
capture their share of the market abroad, especially in developing countries. Vietnam 
was the first major destination for China’s motorcycle exports, as seen in the massive 
numbers of motorcycles exported to Vietnam in the years 1999 to 2001. Even though 
the exports of motorcycles diminished after 2001, the engagement of Chinese firms in 
Vietnam has continued in the form of direct investment and exports of parts and 
components. Based on a detailed analysis of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry, this paper 
                                                  
2 For instance, see “Africa finds trade ties to China lucrative – Businesses adjust to rise in Asian 
goods as restrictions fall,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 Dec. 2006 on Africa and “Chinese imports 
can hurt domestic industry,” The Nation, 3 Nov. 2005 on Pakistan. In the case of Vietnam, with the 
rapid expansion of two-way trade, China has emerged as its largest trading partner. Massive inflows 
of Chinese goods have been observed in numerous industries extending from garments and footwear 
to steel, agricultural machinery and automobiles. 
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argues that China’s rise as an exogenous shock transformed existing value chains 
governed by Japanese lead firms and gave rise to new value chains organised by local 
assemblers in collaboration with Chinese firms, thereby substantially changing the 
development and upgrading trajectories for local firms. By doing so, the paper seeks to 
present a few general implications for wider global value chain (GVC) literature and the 
upgrading of local firms. 
The rest of the paper will be organised as follows. Section 2 discusses China’s 
recent rise in the motorcycle industry. Section 3 presents how the GVC approach can be 
applied to analyse the development of local firms in this industry. Section 4 looks at the 
development of the motorcycle industry in Vietnam, focusing how China’s rise 
transformed value chains within the industry. Section 5 analyses the development paths 
and upgrading trajectories of Vietnam’s local suppliers, focusing on three types of firms 
incorporated into different types of value chains. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. The Motorcycle Industry and China’s Rise 
 
The motorcycle industry has long been characterised by the overwhelming 
dominance of four Japanese lead firms. This section discusses how their dominance has 
been established and exercised and how China’s rise has challenged their dominance. 
 
2.1 Japanese dominance and the market shift towards developing countries 
 
Figure 1 shows trends in the production and sales of motorcycles from 1975 to 2005, 
highlighting some prominent features of the industry. 
First, large markets of motorcycles also tend to be major producers, although a few 
major producers have also become large exporters of the products.  
Second, up to the 1980s, Japan stood out among the major producers of motorcycles. 
A breakthrough came in 1958, when Honda launched the highly acclaimed “Supercub3” 
and established an integrated mass production system that guaranteed superiority in 
                                                  
3 The derivative models of “Supercub” are still popular in developing countries today, especially 
Southeast Asia. 
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terms of quality and price over its competitors including the major producers in Europe 
(Otahara 2000). Honda, together with the three firms that successfully followed suit 
(namely, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki), eventually came to be known as the four 
Japanese giants. These four giants established and maintained overwhelming dominance 
on a global scale for decades.  
 
Figure 1  Production and Sales of Motorcycles 1975-2005
Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Sekai Nirinsha Gaikyo (World Motorcycle Facts & Figures) , various years.
































1975 1985 1995 2005





























1975 1985 1995 2005
 
 
Third, the major producers-cum-markets have shifted over time. Despite variations 
across countries or regions, the experience of Asian countries analysed in Sato and 
Ohara eds. (2006) shows: (1) the demand for motorcycles as a means of transport 
increases rapidly at a relatively early phase of economic development; and (2) as 
economic development proceeds, the industry enters the “demand saturation” phase. 
During this phase, automobiles gradually start to replace motorcycles, and the demand 
for motorcycles shifts towards high-end leisure and sports-use models. Reflecting this 
pattern, major markets have shifted from Japan, France and Italy up to the 1980s to 
developing countries since the 1990s.  
As the major market started to shift to developing countries, the four Japanese giants 
started to export their products abroad and, subsequently, to invest abroad in local 
production of motorcycles4. As of 1996, production by factories of the four giants in 
                                                  
4 As succinctly expressed in Honda’s strategy “to produce where the demand is,” Japanese lead 
firms have attempted to manufacture and deliver products according to the local customers’ needs by 
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Japan (i.e., including exports) accounted for approximately half of the global production 
of motorcycles (Otahara 2000). If production by foreign firms that received technology 
transfer from the four Japanese giants is included, over 70% of the global production of 
motorcycles was under the influence of the four Japanese giants (ibid.). 
 
2.2 China’s rise 
 
The past decade witnessed an overwhelming shift in gravity of the industry towards 
developing economies. By 2005 China, India, and Indonesia had become the top three 
producers of motorcycles in the world, together accounting for 74.9 % of the number of 
motorcycles produced globally (Figure 1). Of particular note, China has quickly 
expanded its production of motorcycles since the early 1990s to emerge as the world’s 
largest producer of motorcycles, producing over 17 million motorcycles in 2004, 3.9 
million of which were exported overseas (China Automotive Technology & Research 
Center and China Automotive Industry League, 2005).  
This shift in the gravity of the industry is accompanied by another remarkable 
change – the emergence of local motorcycle firms in developing countries, especially 
China5. In China, the number of motorcycle firms increased consistently, reaching as 
many as 154 in 20036. In a market characterised by a dispersed and unstable structure, 
numerous local Chinese firms competed relentlessly, mainly on the basis of price, in 
sharp contrast with the oligopolistic market structure established in Japan in the 1960s 
(Otahara 2000). These local firms were producing largely homogeneous products, that is, 
imitations of foreign (mostly Japanese) base models or models that incorporate some 
minor changes to them7.  
It is in China that the Japanese giants, for the first time in their history, failed to 
                                                                                                                                                  
gradually transferring production of parts, materials and final products, distribution and after-sales 
service, and a part of product development to countries with large markets for motorcycles.   
5 Local motorcycle firms in Taiwan and India also experienced growth. See Sato (1999, 2006) on 
Taiwan and Shimane (2006) on India. 
6 This figure only includes officially registered firms (Ohara 2006). 
7 Ohara (2006) calls the product development undertaken by local Chinese firms as “minor-change- 
type” product development, as opposed to the “major-change-type” product development undertaken 
by Japanese lead firms. Among various base models, Honda’s C100 (commonly known as 
“Supercub”) is most commonly adopted by Chinese firms. The models based on C100, introduced 
by Chinese firms, proliferated throughout the Vietnamese market. 
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establish a leading position vis-à-vis local motorcycle firms. As of the end of the 1990s, 
about twenty foreign joint venture firms in China (ten of which were established by the 
four Japanese giants) together accounted for just 5% of the market (Ohara 2006: 21). 
Even in 2005, Sundiro Honda Motorcycle Co., Ltd., the largest of the joint venture 
firms, ranked the eighth in terms of quantity of sales and accounted for just 5.7% of the 
market, while all the other top-ten motorcycle firms were local firms (Ohara 2006: 26).  
 
(Source) China Customs data taken from World Trade Atlas.
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After the turn of the century, the Chinese motorcycle firms started to make their 
strides into overseas markets through exports or direct investment. Figure 2 shows the 
trend and destination of China’s motorcycle exports since the late 1990s. Vietnam, 
which is to be examined in detail in the two subsequent sections, was by far the largest 
destination for China’s motorcycle exports from 1999 to 2001, though the destination 
subsequently shifted to other countries. 
 
 
2.3 The development of local firms as suppliers under Japanese dominance – The 
cases of Thailand and Indonesia –  
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In the meantime, the four Japanese lead firms had established a firm position in the 
Southeast Asian market. In Thailand and Indonesia, the Japanese lead firms established 
joint ventures with local firms to assemble imported “completely knocked down” 
(CKD) parts from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Through decades of operation, these 
joint ventures established firm control of the market by consolidating production and 
procurement, marketing, distribution, and after-sales service; and the four Japanese lead 
firms together accounted for 97% of the market in Thailand and 90% in Indonesia in 
2004 (Higashi 2006; Sato 2006). Recently, Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki even established 
regional headquarters and/or research and development centres in Thailand to undertake 
product planning and design for the regional models in collaboration with the 
headquarters and research institute in Japan.  
An important point to note is that Chinese motorcycles did not succeed in 
penetrating these markets8. Apart from the policies (e.g., import controls and product 
standards) that effectively blocked Chinese products from flowing in, consumers in both 
countries “rejected” Chinese motorcycles due to their poor quality, lack of after-sales 
service, and the difficulties of trading in the secondhand motorcycle market9.   
The operations of Japanese lead firms in Thailand and Indonesia encouraged 
development of local parts suppliers. Since local content policies were in place in both 
countries since the 1970s, the Japanese lead firms were compelled to increase the local 
content ratio over time. Ironically, the local content ratio made a leap after import tariffs 
on motorcycle parts were reduced and local content policies were abandoned towards 
the end of the 1990s. The local content ratio of major Japanese lead firms has reached 
98% in Thailand (Higashi 2006) and 91% in Indonesia (Sato 2006). The highly 
localised sourcing, which is in sharp contrast with globalised sourcing patterns seen in 
industries like apparel or electronics, is explained by a number of factors: sufficiently 
large local markets; ease of entry for local firms due to the use of mature technology 
and small size of the product (compared to automobiles, for instance); non-standardised 
nature of the parts, i.e., parts that are specifically designed to meet the road conditions, 
                                                  
8 In Indonesia, Chinese motorcycles temporarily captured a market share of 18% in 2000, but their 
market share quickly declined to less than 10% in 2002 (Sato 2006). 
9 Sato (2006) argues that the oligopolistic market structure dominated by Japanese lead firms is 
sustained by consumers who are used to quality and after-sales services guaranteed by Japanese lead 
firms throughout the long years of their operations. 
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climate, and consumers’ preferences specific to the country; and the need for closely 
coordinated adjustments between the parts.  
 
 
3. The “Global Value Chains (GVC)” Approach 
 
The GVC approach has become a powerful tool to analyse the paths to spurring 
competitiveness, learning and innovation, and upgrading of local firms in developing 
countries10. The approach tries to link the concept of “value chains,” or the sequence of 
value-added activities that are required to get a certain set of products to market 
(Sturgeon 2000), with the globalization of industries that has progressed in tandem with 
the fragmentation of production and distribution activities. The key driver of these 
processes has been the global buyers or producers, often referred to as “lead firms”, 
which play a crucial role in coordinating and governing the value chains. Over the past 
few decades, these chains have come to increasingly incorporate firms from developing 
countries, often as suppliers of products or parts/components to the lead firms. 
One of the central contentions of the GVC approach is that that insertion into these 
chains offers firms from developing countries with certain opportunities and limitations 
for development and upgrading of capabilities. This contention has been supported by 
numerous case studies on industries led by powerful global buyers that have developed 
highly globalised production networks targeting markets in industrialised countries, 
such as apparel, footwear, furniture, electronics, and automobiles (e.g., Schmitz and 
Knorringa 2001; Bazan and Navas-Alemán 2004; Palpacuer, Gibbon, and Thomsen 
2005; Quadros 2004). The underlying assumption is that producing for global lead firms 
provides the local firms with access to the huge market in industrialised countries that 
these firms exercise control over, and requires them to meet the stringent global 
standards in terms of product quality, safety, environment, and labour that they impose 
on suppliers11.  
The motorcycle industry, with highly localised production targeting the markets in 
                                                  
10 For the key ideas and concepts adopted in the GVC approach, see Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky, 
and Sturgeon (2001), Sturgeon (2001), Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, 2004).  
11 Nadvi and Waltring (2004) discuss the typologies of global standards and their emerging trends. 
Ponte and Gibbons (2005)  
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developing countries, is clearly at odds with the sectors frequently taken up in the GVC 
literature. However, if the GVC approach is about understanding the nature of the 
relationships between firms that participate in the networks of global trade and their 
implications for development (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001:19-20), the nature of the 
industry itself should not preclude us from applying the approach for analysis of the 
motorcycle industry. Motorcycle firms should be refereed to as “lead firms” and parts 
and components manufacturers should be referred to as “suppliers.” Put in the GVC 
framework, those characteristics of the motorcycle industry, such as a greater scope for 
participation of local firms in supplying parts and components, as implied by the highly 
localised sourcing pattern mentioned above, together with the powerful role of the 
Japanese lead firms in setting parameters for local suppliers to operate within the chains 
organised by them, suggest the viability of the GVC approach in analyzing the 
development of local suppliers that participate in the value chains governed by Japanese 
lead firms. 
The Thai and Indonesian cases, briefly discussed above, may be helpful in 
illustrating the possible application of the GVC approach to the motorcycle industry. 
While most value chain activities – from manufacturing of parts and components to 
assembly, marketing, retail sales and after-sales service – are undertaken where the 
market is, i.e., in Thailand and Indonesia, there are a few important exceptions. The first 
exception is product development and design. As the activities with the highest value 
added and the utmost strategic significance for the lead firm, these activities are 
undertaken in the lead firm’s headquarters in Japan in collaboration with regional 
headquarters in Thailand. The second is raw materials and materials for making 
components. Especially in the case of Indonesia, much of the raw materials still have to 
be imported from abroad (Sato 2006). The participation of local firms has been mainly 
in the production of parts and components, where some local suppliers managed to 
develop as suppliers by striving to meet the “quality, cost and delivery” (QCD) 
requirements imposed by the lead firms 12 . Here, the key to understanding the 
development trajectory of local firms is in the nature of their relationship with the lead 
                                                  
12 Though local suppliers in Thailand and Indonesia both followed roughly similar paths to 
development within their relationships with Japanese lead firms, there are some variations across 
countries and across firms within each country. For details, see Higashi (2006) on Thailand and Sato 
(2006) on Indonesia.  
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firms and its implications for the capability development of local suppliers.  
 
 
4. The Emergence and Transformation of Japanese and Local Chinese Chains in 
Vietnam’s Motorcycle Industry 
 
Though Vietnam’s market for motorcycles first started to grow only after the early 
1990s, the country is currently the third largest producer and market for motorcycles in 
Southeast Asia after Indonesia and Thailand. We shall observe in detail the evolution of 
Vietnam’s motorcycle industry, focusing on the emergence and transformation of 
different types of value chains in the industry amidst China’s rise. 
 
4.1 Vietnam’s motorcycle industry – how it got started 
 
Vietnam as a market of motorcycles has a long history dating back to the 1960s. 
During the Vietnam War, tens of thousands of “mopeds” were imported into South 
Vietnam each year, mainly from Japan and the US (Fujita 2006). After the end of the 
war these secondhand motorcycles remained, while motorcycles continued to be 
imported from Eastern Europe (Beresford and Dang Phong 2000). It was under the 
severe road conditions and the shortage of fuel and replacement parts during the central 
planning period that the Vietnamese formed a strong preference for secondhand 
“Hondas” made in Japan, which were known to be extremely durable, economical, and 
practical. After market-oriented economic reforms called doi moi (renovation) started in 
1986, demand for motorcycles started to increase gradually, and the import of 
secondhand Honda-brand motorcycles through official channels, especially from Japan 
and Thailand, resumed.   
Vietnam’s history as the production base of motorcycles only dates back to the 
mid-1990s, when the government launched an import substitution policy by erecting 
trade barriers and providing incentives for foreign direct investment in the motorcycle 
industry. Attracted by the growing market, several motorcycle firms began assembling 
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“incompletely knocked down” (IKD) parts13 by the late 1990s (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Major foreign motorcycle firms in Vietnam
Name of the firm Year ofLicense Ownership structure
Vietnam Manufacture & Export
Processing Co., Ltd. (VMEP) 1992 Chinfon Group (Taiwan, 100%)
GMN Automobile & Motorcycle
Parts Manufacture JV Co., Ltd. 1995
Chaikomol Business (Thailand, 30%), SKB (Thailand, 10%), New
Chip Xeng (Laos, 30%), General Export Import Co. (Vietnam, 30%)
Vietnam Suzuki Corp. 1995 Suzuki Corp. (Japan, 35%)、Sojitz (Japan, 35%), Vikyno: SouthernAgricultural Machinery Corp.(Vietnam, 30%)
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1996 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (42%), Asian Honda Motors (Thailand, 28%),Vietnam Engine & Agricultural Machinery Corp. (Vietnam, 30%)
Yamaha Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1998 Yamaha Motors (Japan, 46%)、Hong Leong Industries (Malaysia,24%), Vietnam Forestry Corporation (30%)
Lifan Motorcycle Manufacturing JV
Co. 2002
Chonqing Lifan (China）70%, Vietnam Import-Export Technology
Development Co. (30%)
(Source) Survey by the author; Survey commissioned to the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of
Social Science by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004.  
 
Table 2 Sales of Honda-brand motorcycles in Vietnam (1992-2003) Unit: thousand units
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total sales of motorcycles 100 300 368 420 499 260 379 459 1,074 1,960 1,800 1,300
Total Sales of Honda-brand motorcycles (a) n.a. 150 195 212 188 128 261 291 345 246 390 429
（Honda's market share) n.a. 50% 53% 50% 38% 49% 69% 63% 32% 13% 22% 33%
Production in Honda Vietnam (b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 99 166 163 389 420
Exports of Honda Vietnam (c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 24
Sales of imported Honda-brand motorcycles (d) n.a. 150 195 212 188 128 179 192 179 83 2 33
(Notes) 
1) (d) is calcalculated as (a) - { (b) - (c) }.
2) "Production of Honda Vietnam" includes production of GMN, a joint venture firm established by Thai, Lao and Vietnamese firms
engaged in production and distribution of Honda-brand motorcycles in respective countries under the leadership of Asian Honda Motors in 
Thailand.
(Source) "Reference Materials for Seminar on Honda's Business in Asia" available on the website of Honda Motor Co., Ltd.  
 
Contrary to the expectations of the foreign lead firms, the growth of the market 
remained stagnant throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the Japanese lead firms had to 
compete with the products of their own group firms abroad, especially in Thailand and 
Japan. Despite the high tariffs and non-tariff barriers imposed on motorcycles, new and 
secondhand Japanese-brand motorcycles continued to be imported as the consumers 
maintained their preference for products “Made in Japan” over “Made in Thailand”, and 
“Made in Thailand” over “Made in Vietnam.” As of the late 1990s, “Honda” brand 
motorcycles imported from abroad accounted for around half of the market (Table 2). 
Still, in an oligopolistic market, foreign motorcycle firms were able set extremely high 
prices that exceeded the high costs of operations, which enabled them to enjoy 
                                                  
13 This means that, unlike assembly of CKD parts, the motorcycle firms were required to source at 
least certain parts within the country.  
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substantial rent. For instance, the price of “Super Dream” launched by Honda Vietnam 
in 1998 was 28 million dongs (approximately US$2,000), only slightly lower than the 
prices of Honda brand motorcycles imported from Japan or Thailand, which ranged 
from US$2,200 to 2,500. 
In short, as of the late 1990s, the Japanese lead firms had just started their operations 
and were yet to establish firm control of the market or to develop local production 
networks in Vietnam. The Japanese lead firms failed to recognise the vast potential 
demand for low-priced motorcycles in the Vietnamese market. 
 
4.2 The “China shock”  
 
The above situation was completely transformed by the “China shock”. As Chinese 
motorcycle firms faced stagnant sales in the domestic market in the mid-1990s and 
looked for an outlet for growing inventories, they recognised Vietnam as a promising 
market for low-priced motorcycles. On the Vietnamese side, as well, some traders were 
starting to explore the possibilities of making profits by importing motorcycles from 
China. 
 
Table 3 Vietnam's Motorcycle imports Unit: Million US$
(1) Completely-Build-Up Units
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2 2 1 0 45 419 426 50 6 8
108 153 59 27 19 21 14 9 15
85 99 60 49 44 52 10 0 0 1
Hong Kong (re-export) n.a. n.a. 2 2 4 5 12 24 21 16
n.a. 21 14 20 7 3 3 11 6 3
n.a. 10 5 5 1 3 6 22 13 8
(2) Parts and Components
Type of parts 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
engine 0 0 0 0 0 5 50 80 23
others 0 0 0 1 2 19 35 52 36 4
engine 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
others 0 3 16 46 50 80 56 51 40 58
engine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
others 0 0 0 3 3 4 10 13 7 7
engine n.a. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
others n.a. 7 4 6 8 28 28 59 49 64
(Notes) The above figures are export data reported by exporting countries in CIF (instead of FOB).
















Between 1999 and 2001, the number of motorcycles imported from China into 
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Vietnam surged dramatically, peaking in 2001 (Table 3). Since the Vietnamese 
government prohibited imports of completely-built up units in 1998 and implemented 
local content policies in 2001, “Chinese motorcycles” had to be imported as 
knocked-down kits and assembled by local firms (hereinafter referred to as “local 
assemblers”) in Vietnam. As of 2001, 51 local assemblers had emerged. As the local 
content policy had been implemented since 2001, the Vietnamese traders importing 
Chinese knocked-down kits claimed a false local content ratio, much higher than the 
actual ratio, to the Vietnamese authorities in order to evade import tariffs. 
 
Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Sekai Nirinsha Gaikyo (World Motorcycle Facts & Figures) , 2006.
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The impact of the “Chinese motorcycles” was enormous. It significantly reduced the 
price of the motorcycles from the previous 28 million dongs to around 10 million dongs 
in 2000, and further down to 6.3 to 8 million (US$450 to 500) in 200114. With their low 
prices, the Chinese motorcycles penetrated a huge unexploited market – the middle- and 
low-income population in urban and rural areas. This, in effect, significantly expanded 
the market, with the annual sales growing from 370,000 units in 1998 to 2 million in 
2001 (Figure 3). In 2001, “Chinese motorcycles” captured over 70% of this 
significantly enlarged market (Figure 4). At the same time, the rapid proliferation of 
Chinese motorcycles induced numerous social problems, such as traffic accidents, 
traffic congestion, air pollution, and violation of intellectual property rights (Ueda 
                                                  





"Others" include imported motorcycles and motorcycles produced by
foreign lead firms based in Vietnam other than Honda Vietnam.
(Source) Author's interview with Honda Vietnam in Sep., 2004.














In the end, the shock did not persist for long, as demonstrated by a sharp fall in the 
market share of Chinese motorcycles after 2002 (Figure 4). Japanese motorcycle firms, 
seeing their market share significantly diminished, made serious attempts to re-capture 
the market. In 2002, Honda Vietnam launched a new model, “Wave alpha”, priced at 
10.8 million dongs, nearly one-third of its previous models. Though more expensive 
than “Chinese motorcycles,” the new model was applauded by Vietnamese consumers 
who were starting to recognise quality problems in “Chinese motorcycles.” After 2002 
Honda quickly recovered its market share, and the sales of products made by Honda 
Vietnam exceeded the sales of imported Honda-brand motorcycles for the first time 
(Table 2). Yamaha Vietnam, on the other hand, rejected the “low-priced model” strategy 
and consistently emphasised high quality and fashionable design targeting the young 
generation. Yamaha’s new models gained increasing popularity among the newly 
emerging prosperous population in the urban area.    
In contrast, local assemblers faced difficulties after 2002 due to a number of factors: 
quality problems that prompted Vietnamese consumers to turn to foreign-brand 
motorcycles; harsh price competition as foreign motorcycle firms significantly reduced 
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their prices; and strengthening of import controls, product standards, and regulations on 
motorcycle assemblers by the Vietnamese government15. As their market share quickly 
eroded (Figure 4), some of the assemblers abandoned their motorcycle assembling 
business, while others continued their operations on a smaller scale. Those that 
continued their operations attempted to depart from simple assembly of Chinese 
knocked-down kits. These firms sought to advance towards becoming full-fledged 
motorcycle firms by developing their own brand for motorcycles, building their own 
distribution channels, undertaking in-house production of certain core parts, and/or 
upgrading the quality of their products by sourcing parts from Taiwanese, Korean or 
local suppliers in Vietnam. 
 
4.3 The transformation of value chains within Vietnam’s motorcycle industry 
 
Figure 5  Transformation of Lead Firm-Supplier Relationships in Vietnam's Motorcycle Industry
Before "China shock" After "China shock"
Abroad Abroad
Vietnam Vietnam







































The “China shock”, together with the ensuing responses from the government, 
consumers, and firms, significantly transformed the value chains within the industry. 
Figure 5 compares the lead firm-supplier relationships before (around 2001) and after 
(2004-2005) the “China shock”, based on the author’s survey of two major Japanese 
motorcycle firms and their Japanese and Taiwanese first-tier suppliers in 2001/2002 and 
                                                  
15 Decision of the Minister of Industry No.24/2002/QD-BCN on June 10, 2002 issuing the 
regulation on criteria for motorcycle-manufacturing and/or motorcycle assembling enterprises; 
Decision of the Minister of Communications and Transport No.2557/2002/QD-BGTVT on August 
16, 2002 promulgating the regulation on the inspection of quality, technical safety and 
environmental protection in the manufacture and assembly of motorcycles and mopeds of all kinds. 
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2004/2005, as well as several local motorcycle assemblers and their suppliers in 2002 
and 2004/2005.  
Before the “China shock”, the Japanese lead firms were not under strong pressure to 
increase local content – at least until 2001, when the local content policy (announced at 
the end of 1998) was implemented. At this stage, these firms sourced parts mostly from 
abroad (especially Japan and Thailand) as IKD kits as well as from their own factories 
(i.e., in-house production) and Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers that followed their 
lead to invest in Vietnam16. Accordingly, the “Japanese chains” were only beginning to 
evolve, and only a few local suppliers were incorporated into them. Although there were 
numerous local firms engaged in the production of “aftermarket” or replacement parts, 
they were outside the procurement networks of foreign lead firms17. 
As imports of knocked-down part kits from China increased in 1999-2001, new 
value chains led by newly emergent “local assemblers”18 (hereinafter referred to as 
“local Chinese chains”) started to develop. However, it is very difficult to articulate the 
organisation of local Chinese chains at this stage. Available pieces of evidence suggest 
that the sourcing of local assemblers combined Chinese and locally made parts, but it is 
extremely difficult to confirm the proportion of Chinese and local parts. To register 
higher-than-actual local content ratio in order to qualify for lower import tariffs, local 
assemblers imported large numbers of Chinese IKD parts with “Made in Vietnam” 
labels, many of which were resold after being imported to Vietnam19. This resulted in 
the proliferation of motorcycle parts without any indication of origin. Some local 
assemblers also report that they sourced some parts from local firms when Chinese part 
                                                  
16 13 Taiwanese suppliers followed Sanyang, the Taiwanese motorcycle firm, and set up subsidiaries 
near its factory in the mid-1990s (Chen and Jou 2002). Some Japanese suppliers also followed 
Honda, but the number was smaller. 
17 According to the author’s interviews with a Japanese expert who investigated motorcycle parts 
manufacturers in Ho Chi Minh City in the mid- to late 1990s, numerous local small-scale firms and 
households were engaged in the production of aftermarket parts, including piston, piston rings, 
cylinders, gaskets, crankshafts, valves, and sprockets. These firms and households included those 
that had been engaged in machinery parts since the central planning period (before 1986) and others 
that entered after the late 1980s as the demand for motorcycle parts increased. 
18 In many cases, firms registered as “assemblers” turned out to be traders without production lines; 
instead of assembling the parts themselves, they subcontracted the assembly to other local firms (the 
author’s interview with a state-owned assembler, and another state-owned firm that assembled 
motorcycles only for a few years around 2001-2002, conducted in 2002 and 2005 respectively). 
19 “Dirty deals on bike parts,” Vietnam Investment Review, No.524 Oct.29-Nov.4, 2001; Fujita 
(2006). 
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kits included defective or rusty parts20.  
 
Table 4  Procurement of Parts by Two Japanese Lead Firms in Vietnam
July, 2001 Sep., 2004 Aug., 2002 Sep., 2004
52% 83% 50% 74%
Japanese 15 18 10 23
Taiwanese 0 14 22
Korean 0 1 2
Local 5 13 1 3














After 2002, the Japanese chains went through a significant transformation, and the 
local Chinese chains started to take on a clearer shape. There are three important factors 
underlying the transformation within the Japanese chains: (1) the local content policy, 
which was originally introduced in the end of 1998 but came into effect only in the 
beginning of 2001; (2) the need to reduce production costs in order to compete with the 
“Chinese motorcycles”; and (3) the increased volume of production as they recovered 
market shares in an enlarged market. All of these factors encouraged an increased use of 
locally sourced parts including those of local suppliers. Particularly, in developing the 
new low-priced model, Wave alpha, Honda imposed substantial cost reduction targets 
on virtually all suppliers. Honda even announced that it was ready to switch suppliers as 
long as the alternative suppliers fulfilled the required standards and their costs were 
lower than that of the existing ones, regardless of nationality21. Table 4 shows that the 
two Japanese lead firms, MA and MB, significantly increased the local content ratio 
between 2001/2002 and 2004. The number of local suppliers newly incorporated into 
the Japanese chains increased but was still limited. Particularly in the case of MB, the 
increase in the local content ratio was realised mainly by increased procurement from 
Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers in Vietnam. 
                                                  
20 Based on the author’s interview in 2005 with a state-owned enterprise that used to assemble 
motorcycles temporarily. 
21 Based on the author’s interview with Honda Vietnam and Honda Thailand in August to September, 
2004. Also according to the author’s interview with Honda Vietnam, they even adopted 28 types of 
parts produced by Chinese firms when they launched Wave alpha. The managers of two Japanese 
suppliers in Vietnam, to which Honda contributes capital, interviewed by the author in 2002 and 
2004 respectively, remarked that they were at risk of losing transactions with Honda if they failed to 
achieve the cost reduction targets set by Honda.  
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Table 5  The number of second-tier suppliers used by foreign first-tier suppliers
Japanese Taiwanese/Korean Local Total
PM (Japanese) 14 24 diecasting, polishing, heat treatment,plasit injection molding
PN (Japanese) 1 3 2 6 diecasting
PO (Taiwanese) 1 4 40 45 diecasting, plastic injection molding,wires, housings
PP (Taiwanese) 1 13 8 22 stamping, cutting, plating, washers
PQ (Taiwanese) 0 15 n.a.
PR (Korean) 0 5 45 50 plastic injection molding, etc.
(Source) Author's interviews conducted in Aug.-Sep. 2004 and July- Aug. 2005.
Main Processe Undertaken or Types of






The number of Second-tier Suppliers
 
 
Another change within the Japanese chains is that the first-tier foreign suppliers 
(Japanese and Taiwanese) started to source sub-components and materials from local 
second-tier suppliers (Table 5). According to a Japanese supplier PM, they responded to 
the Japanese lead firm’s pressure for cost reduction, initially by replacing the imported 
parts with parts sourced from Japanese second-tier suppliers in Vietnam, and then 
eventually by replacing the parts sourced from the Japanese second-tier suppliers with 
parts sourced by Taiwanese or local second-tier suppliers22.  
The local Chinese chains also went through an important transformation. In 
response to the local content requirement and the newly introduced standards on 
products and motorcycle assembling firms, some local assemblers started to produce 
some parts in-house and to source parts from Taiwanese, Chinese and local suppliers 
based in Vietnam. One of the five local assemblers surveyed by the author achieved a 
local content ratio of 90% in 2003, while the average was 63%. In-house production of 




5. The Development Path and Upgrading of Local Suppliers 
                                                  
22 Based on the author’s interview in September 2004. 
23 Among the five local assemblers surveyed by the author in 2004 and 2005, three firms revealed 
the sources of their technology for production of motorcycles and core components. All three firms 
mentioned China, while two of them also mentioned Korea and Taiwan, respectively, as additional 
sources. The local assembler with the largest market share has a joint venture with a Chinese firm for 
mass production of motorcycle parts (Fujita 2006).  
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This section shifts the focus from the structure of “value chains” to “local firms” 
within the chains, and attempts a preliminary analysis on the development path and 
upgrading of local suppliers. While the upgrading trajectories of “local assemblers” also 
constitute an important agenda for research on the development of local firms24, this 
paper focuses specifically on the development path and upgrading of local firms as 
suppliers.  
 
5.1 Typology of local firms and the survey sample 
 
Given the transformation of the value chains discussed above, this section 
specifically focuses on three types of local suppliers: (1) first-tier suppliers of Japanese 
lead firms, (2) second-tier suppliers of Japanese lead firms, and (3) suppliers of local 
assemblers25. Comparison of the three types of suppliers is expected to shed light on 
how the different nationalities of the lead firms governing the value chains and the 
different positions of local firms within the value chains affects the upgrading of local 
firms. In addition, the above three categories are expected to cover a sufficiently large 
proportion of the local suppliers, given the tendency of Taiwanese and Chinese lead 
firms to source from Taiwanese and Chinese suppliers, respectively26.  
The survey samples are listed in Table 6. The samples cover six first-tier suppliers of 
leading Japanese firms, three second tier suppliers of Japanese lead firms, and three 
suppliers of local assemblers, all surveyed by the authors between 2002 and 2005. Some 
                                                  
24 The author’s preliminary analysis on the local assemblers is in Fujita (2006), which can be briefly 
summarised as follows. (1) Those assemblers that emphasised learning through active acquisition of 
capabilities in production, branding, and distribution have largely stumbled, facing difficulties in 
competing with powerful Japanese lead firms. (2) The few local assemblers that performed well 
were the ones that pursued low prices by relying on Chinese counterparts for production of parts and 
without active strategies to build their own brands or distribution networks, which implies only 
limited accumulation of capabilities within the local assemblers. 
25 In cases where a local firm was supplying parts to both a Japanese lead firm and a local 
assemblers, the firm is categorised under first- or second-tier supplier to Japanese lead firms. Those 
firms that supplied parts only to local assemblers are categorised here. 
26 According to a survey conducted by the Vietnam Institute of Economics in 2004, both VMEP (a 
subsidiary of the Taiwanese motorcycle firm, Sanyang) and Lifan Vietnam (a subsidiary of the 
Chinese motorcycle firm, Lifan) use very limited numbers of local suppliers. However, this is not to 
deny the need to study the upgrading trajectories of local second-tier suppliers of VMEP and Lifan to 
see if they differ substantially from that of the three groups of local parts firms analysed in this 
section. 
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of them were surveyed more than once.  
 























































J household goods 30 40% 242





PF state 1989 1997 Volts, nuts J bicycle parts, partsfor furniture 55 15% 262










L, T(P) parts for electricappliances 24 n.a. 200
PI state 1995 2002 ElectricParts L, T(P) bicycle parts 19 47% 185
PJ state 1974 2000 Handles etc. L bearings 30 13% 385










L aftermarket parts 58 60% 280
(Notes) "State-owned enterprises" includes those that have already been equitized (transformed into joint stock companies).
(Source) 1) Survey commissioned to Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science
 by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004.




















5.2 First-tier suppliers of Japanese lead firms 
 
Despite the small number of local firms that fall under this category, these firms do 
stand out in terms of turnover and the scale of production (see Table 6) as well as the 
extent of upgrading (to be discussed below). With regard to the development path, all 
six firms surveyed had had previous manufacturing experience mainly in metal 
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processing before they started to produce motorcycle parts, and all five of the firms that 
provided information replied that they became first-tier suppliers of Japanese lead firms 
prior to the “China shock.” The success of these firms is closely associated with the fact 
that all six of the sample firms are state-owned, large-scale, and have a relatively long 
history, characteristics which – put in the context of Vietnam – imply that these firms 
were equipped with a large pool of human resources with a basic knowledge of 
production technology, and that they were in a relatively advantaged position to 
mobilise capital for investment. 
If we focus on the relationship between local suppliers and the Japanese lead firms, 
we can see that the lead firms exerted substantial control over the suppliers. The lead 
firms set the parameters for transactions, in the sense that local suppliers were expected 
to manufacture the parts exactly to the orders and specifications provided by the lead 
firm, fulfilling the required QCD levels 27 . Since the local suppliers lacked the 
experience of producing motorcycle parts to strict QCD standards, the lead firms 
offered assistance in terms of production and production management technology (but 
no financial assistance), often sending their engineers from Japan, especially during the 
initial phase. The lead firms constantly monitored the QCD levels of suppliers and 
provided assistance when necessary. In turn, the suppliers were expected to show a 
long-term commitment to fulfil the expectations of the lead firms. The fact that three out 
of the five suppliers surveyed sell motorcycle parts only to foreign lead firms and not to 
local assemblers should be interpreted as an indication of their commitment.  
However, broadening the focus to the suppliers’ business as a whole, a somewhat 
different picture emerges. All the suppliers maintained production of their traditional 
products other than motorcycle parts, though the degree of dependence on the lead firms 
varied: the share of motorcycle parts in the firms’ total sales ranged between 15% and 
88%. Some have even started to diversify their products and customers outside the 
motorcycle industry (to be discussed below). Overall, the lead firm-supplier relationship 
in Vietnam was only emerging and has not deepened to the extent of Thailand and 
Indonesia. In Indonesia, the lead firm-supplier relationship has deepened to the extent 
that roughly 50% of the local suppliers to Japanese lead firms surveyed owe 60-80% of 
                                                  
27 Based on the author’s interview with Honda Vietnam in September 2004. 
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their sales to their single largest customers, with which they have more than 10 years of 
transactions (Sato 2006: 294-295). 
The local suppliers experienced different types of upgrading within the Japanese 
chains. The type that was most commonly observed among the surveyed firms was 
renewal and improvement of production processes that enabled mass production of 
specific parts to meet the high QCD levels required by the lead firms. This was often 
achieved by concentrating investments and efforts into specific types of parts and 
production processes. In most surveyed firms, such specialization was a drastic shift 
away from the closed and integrated production system whereby individual firms 
undertook various production processes within their factories and the dispersed product 
structure whereby individual firms produced varieties of products in small quantities – 
features typical of state-owned enterprises in Vietnam. For instance, whereas PB had 
been engaged in the production of a variety of machinery parts including aluminum and 
steel parts, MA’s decision to order sprockets from PB caused the firm to concentrate its 
investment and other resources in the steel stamping processes so as to reach the QCD 
levels required by MA. In 2003, the production of sprockets reached 1.24 million units. 
As PB successfully increased production of sprockets with required QCD levels, MA 
started to order other types of steel-made parts.  
In terms of other types of upgrading, the results were mixed. PA and PC acquired 
production-related functions beyond simple production of parts, e,g, manufacturing 
molds, jigs, and/or tools, though none of the surveyed firms showed any sign of 
acquiring design functions within the Japanese chain28. Some surveyed firms diversified 
the types of motorcycle parts produced or diversified their own products beyond 
motorcycle parts, which appears to be largely the result of active strategies pursued by 
individual firms. For instance, by 2005, PC started to supply home-furnishing products 
made of stainless steel to a large European buyer, while it also tried to boost the sales of 
its traditional products, i.e. stainless steel kitchenware, in the local market by 
introducing new products. On the other hand, although PB maintains parts for 
agricultural machinery and diesel engines as its traditional products, no particular 
                                                  
28 Higashi (2006) and Sato (2006) also present similar findings with regard to Thailand and 
Indonesia, respectively, where the relationship between local suppliers and Japanese lead firms has 
evolved over three to four decades. 
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attempt to strengthen this line of business was observed. The highest priority of the firm 
was on boosting the relationship with Japanese lead firms.  
 
5.3 Second-tier suppliers to Japanese lead firms 
 
The second-tier suppliers of Japanese lead firms include a larger number of local 
firms. Though a precise figure is unavailable, Table 5 shows there were more than 100 
local second-tier suppliers under just six foreign first-tier suppliers surveyed. The 
author’s survey of sample firms reveals several characteristics. First, in contrast to the 
first-tier suppliers, most of the second-tier suppliers were small- and medium-scale local 
firms, both state-owned and private, that were usually located near the first-tier 
suppliers. Second, most of the second-tier suppliers were previously producers of 
aftermarket parts29, bicycle parts, and parts for various kinds of machinery, and started 
production of motorcycle parts for assembly after the “China shock.” Third, all of the 
sample firms were also suppliers to local assemblers. In other words, these firms 
managed to be incorporated into the Japanese chains as second-tier suppliers after 
accumulating experience as suppliers for local assemblers.  
The second-tier suppliers were usually under the control of first-tier suppliers with 
no direct relationship with the lead firms, with the exception of PH. While PH was 
engaged in plating processes for parts produced by a Taiwanese first-tier supplier, PH 
also received direct assistance from the Japanese lead firm for which the Taiwanese 
first-tier supplier supplied parts. While the relationship between the second-tier supplier 
and the first-tier supplier (or the lead firm, in the case of PH) was characterised by acute 
power asymmetry similar to the case of first-tier suppliers discussed above. However, 
the degree of control exerted by the first-tier supplier was relatively weaker than in the 
relationship between the lead firm and the first-tier supplier, reflecting the differences in 
available resources and experience in monitoring, evaluating, and assisting upgrading of 
the suppliers30. Though there were variations among second-tier suppliers, monitoring 
                                                  
29 Even before the “China shock,” Vietnam had numerous local firms producing aftermarket parts 
(or replacement parts) mainly for second-hand Honda motorcycles. According to the author’s 
interview with industrial specialists, these firms emerged and developed from the early 1990s 
onwards. 
30 Since the headquarters of Japanese lead firm MA attached strategic importance to local supplier 
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by the first-tier supplier was generally not as strict or systematic, and assistance was 
provided but not as frequent or generous as in the case of Japanese lead firms discussed 
above. Unlike the first-tier suppliers, the second-tier suppliers generally maintained 
their transactions with local assemblers, with the exception of PH (Table 5).  
Similar to the first-tier suppliers, second-tier suppliers achieved mass production by 
specialization in particular types of parts and/or particular production processes with 
required QCD levels. PG had previously undertaken both die-casting and machining 
processes for bicycle parts within their factory, but the Japanese first-tier supplier only 
subcontracted machining process to PG. In turn, PG concentrated its resources in 
improving the machining line to achieve the required QCD levels under the supervision 
and assistance of the first-tier supplier. Yet, the scale of production and the level of 
precision achieved remained modest compared to the first-tier suppliers discussed 
above.  
Again, the results were mixed regarding other types of upgrading. The surveyed 
firms showed no particular signs of diversification into other functions beyond 
production. PH diversified both the types of motorcycle parts they supply and their 
customers by starting to undertake the plating of electric and electronic parts for 
Japanese firms. However, this upgrading seems to be the result of firm-specific 
circumstances and efforts, i.e., the monitoring and assistance the firm directly received 
from the Japanese lead firm and its active efforts in meeting the required QCD levels by 
hiring a part-time Japanese technical advisor. The results suggest that upgrading is not 
automatic. 
 
5.4 Suppliers to local assemblers 
 
The majority of local firms producing motorcycle parts fell under this category. As 
Table 6 shows, this category includes firms that are state-owned and private, old and 
new, and of different sizes. Most of these firms were previously engaged in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 their limited manpower and resources in Vietnam.     
development at the sites of its global operations, its subsidiary in Vietnam was able to exploit a pool 
of engineers experienced in evaluating, monitoring and training the local suppliers based in Japan or 
Vietnam. On the other hand, foreign parts suppliers usually had to assist the second-tier suppliers 
with 
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production of bicycle parts, aftermarket parts for motorcycles, or parts for other 
machinery (e.g., agricultural machinery), and became suppliers to local assemblers after 
the “China shock.” 
 
Table 7　　What Lead Firms supply to suppliers when order is placed
Sample Drawing Mold
Japanese X X -
Taiwanese X X -
Japanese X X -
Japanese X X -
Japanese (parts) X X -
Japanese X X -
Local X X -
Local X X -
Local X - -
Local X - -
Local X - -
Local X - -
Local X - X













The lead firm-supplier relationship within the local Chinese chains is largely 
market-based, which involves on-the-spot transactions whereby the suppliers basically 
produce as they receive an order. This is explained by the fact that the parts used by 
local assemblers are standardised to the extent that they are based on the same base 
model31, and also the lack of both the capabilities and the means among the local 
assemblers to monitor the suppliers and assist in their upgrading efforts. As Table 7 
shows, local assemblers largely make orders by just providing the samples without 
detailed specifications or drawings. Also, very few local assemblers provide support to 
local suppliers for their long-term upgrading. A local assembler, which has transactions 
with PL, remarked that when they examine the quality of the parts and find it to be 
unsatisfactory, they frequently switch suppliers rather than assist the current ones in 
improving the quality of their products. This type of governance makes it difficult for 
local suppliers to achieve any upgrading. Even in the limited case of assembler-supplier 
                                                  
31 The majority of the models produced by local assemblers in Vietnam are products based on 
Honda’s C100 (commonly known as “Supercub”).  
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collaboration, they tend to face difficulties due to the insufficient capacities of the 
assemblers to assist the suppliers as well as the suppliers themselves. For instance, the 
local assembler discussed above once attempted to produce crankshafts in collaboration 
with a local supplier. However, the assembler eventually decided to give up the attempt 
because of the inability of the local supplier to achieve the required precision and 
quality, and instead came to depend on crankshafts imported from China. 
More fundamentally, all of the surveyed firms experienced a temporary surge in 
production volume during the years 1999-2001, but a sudden drop after 2002, mainly 
for two reasons. First, the orders from local assemblers started to decrease as they 
started to lose their market shares. Second, competition intensified: after the local 
content policy was abandoned and the tariffs on motorcycle parts were reduced in 2003, 
the imports of motorcycle parts, especially from China, started to increase, and some 
Chinese firms even set up subsidiaries in Vietnam to supply motorcycle parts for Lifan, 
a Chinese motorcycle firms that invested in Vietnam in 2002, and local assemblers. In 
the case of PL, turnover decreased by 44% between 2002 and 2005; during the same 
period the share of motorcycle parts for assembly in total turnover decreased from 60% 
to 20%, while the share of aftermarket parts, their traditional products, increased from 
40% to 80%. In PK, too, the product structure has become more or less like the situation 
before the “China shock”, with machinery parts accounting for a significant bulk of the 
share.  
 
5.5 Summing up: development and upgrading patterns of local suppliers 
 
Let us summarize the findings of the analysis in this section. First, how did the 
transformation value chains discussed in the previous section affect the development 
trajectories of local suppliers? Figure 7 illustrates the transformation of the local 
motorcycle parts manufacturing sector. Prior to the China shock, there was a clear 
divide between a handful of local firms that had sufficient resources and capabilities to 
be incorporated into the Japanese value chain and the great majority of local firms 
producing aftermarket parts. The “China shock,” by creating a huge demand for 
standardised motorcycle parts without stringent QCD requirements, prompted the local 
firms previously producing aftermarket parts, as well as firms engaged in related 
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industries, to enter into the production of motorcycle parts and to become suppliers to 
local assemblers. Eventually, some of these suppliers in the local Chinese chains were 
incorporated into the Japanese chains as second-tier suppliers. This suggests that local 
Chinese chains, due the ease of entry, played a crucial role in mobilising and nurturing 
small-scale local firms at a relatively early stage of development. Since only a few years 
had passed since the “China shock” at the time of the survey, it still remains to be seen 
whether some of the second-tier suppliers can eventually shift their position within the 
Japanese chains to become first-tier suppliers themselves.  
 
Figure 7  Transformation of Local Parts Manufacturing Firms
Before "China shock" After "China shock"
(Source) Prepared by the author.
1st-tier Suppliers of Japanese lead firms
Firms producing Aftermarket Parts
1st-tier Suppliers of Japanese lead
2nd-tier Suppliers of Japanese lead firms
Suppliers to Local Assemblers/
Firms producing Aftermarket Parts
 
 
Second, what types of upgrading were achieved by different types of local 
suppliers? Our preliminary analysis shows that, in local Chinese chains, local suppliers 
and local assemblers were engaged in a market-based relationship, where the local 
assemblers lacked the capacity to monitor and assist the local suppliers. The local 
suppliers faced difficulties in achieving any upgrading. On the other hand, in Japanese 
chains, the Japanese lead firms exercised substantial control and supervision over local 
suppliers. Many of the local suppliers participating in Japanese chains achieved 
upgrading, but the types and extent of upgrading varied. While many local suppliers 
incorporated into the Japanese chains experienced renewal and improvement of 
production processes that enabled mass production in accordance with the required 
QCD levels, which would be best categorised as “process upgrading” (Schmitz and 
Humphrey 2004), a divergence in the degree of upgrading was observed. Trajectories 
for other types of upgrading (diversification into other functions, diversification of 
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products, and diversification into other sectors) also differed substantially across firms. 
The firm’s position in the value chain, active strategies and efforts by the firm, the 
degree of monitoring and assistance by the leading firm were cited as some of the likely 





This paper argues that China’s rise might bring about a far-reaching impact on 
developing countries – much beyond what a simple analysis of trade suggests. A 
detailed examination on how the advancement of Chinese firms abroad, which can take 
different modes, affects local firms in developing countries sheds light on an extremely 
important aspect of changes taking place within developing countries that are inevitably 
abstracted in an analysis of trade data. The key factors that need to be examined in 
detail include: the modes of engagement by Chinese firms in the host economy, the 
relationship between Chinese firms and local firms in the host economy, the capabilities 
and strategies of the local firms, and the general business environment that affects the 
viabilities of these strategies, including government policy. 
In the case of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry, what seemed to be a temporary surge 
of imports from China produced a complex set of changes in the value chains and local 
firms. To start with, the creation of “Chinese motorcycles” was clearly a breakthrough 
for the whole industry, in the sense that the use of a well-established base model and 
standardised parts enabled substantial cost reduction, far beyond the imagination of the 
Japanese lead firms until the mid-1990s. Following the GVC approach, we can 
conclude that China’s rise has affected the development of local firms in Vietnam via 
two channels. First, China’s rise, by introducing these “Chinese motorcycles” to the 
Vietnamese market and providing basic technology for production of their parts and 
components, encouraged entry of local firms into assembly, production of components 
and parts, and distribution of motorcycles. Once the local firms had entered, 
endogenous changes were set in motion, as the “Chinese motorcycles” started to evolve 
gradually into Vietnamese motorcycles. While the entry of local firms in the context of 
this specific case study was at least partly a result of government regulations such as 
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import barriers and local content requirements, the experience of Vietnam’s motorcycle 
industry does suggest some of the areas where local firms can play their roles, such as 
the production of relatively simple parts and components and the distribution of the 
products in the local market. The second channel of changes was transformation of the 
existing Japanese chains, as China’s rise put an enormous competitive pressure on the 
Japanese lead firms. In effect, this transformation opened a way for some of the local 
suppliers to enter into the Japanese chains as second-tier suppliers.  
Finally, on the basis of the analysis of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry we would like 
to draw a few implications on the GVC approach and discuss some areas for further 
research. First, “producing for local market” (as opposed to “producing for global 
market” via global buyers) matters. Precisely because the motorcycle industry targeted 
local markets in developing countries, the Japanese lead firms transferred much of the 
value chain activities to countries with large market. This basically means larger space 
for local firms to participate in value chains governed by global lead firms. Furthermore, 
in local markets in developing countries, local lead firms perhaps have a much better 
chance of emerging and competing on a par with global lead firms, given the local 
firms’ advantage in grasping the local market needs, producing price-competitive 
products, and having a better hold of local distribution channels. Further research is 
needed to examine the conditions under which local lead firms emerge, their 
development path and the constraints they face in the course of development, as well as 
the roles they play in the development of local suppliers.  
Second, value chains may evolve over time; e.g., new chains may emerge, and 
existing chains may be transformed. Local firms may move from one chain to another, 
or be incorporated simultaneously into different chains. While the previous research has 
largely centred around the structure and governance of value chains and their 
implications for local firms, the dynamic process of the evolution of value chains 
suggested by this paper points to the importance of placing “local firms” at the centre of 
analysis. In latecomer developing countries that do not have a readily available pool of 
local firms with sufficient capacities to become suppliers to global buyers, how do local 
firms emerge and evolve over time? What are the roles played by different types of 
value chains at different stages of the firms’ development? Further research into the 
dynamic process of local firms’ development and learning would be required to shed 
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